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Brazil’s Bolsa Famı´lia: A Double-Edged Sword?
Anthony Hall
ABSTRACT
In common with most Latin American countries, as governments embrace
safety nets to attack poverty, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes
have become part of mainstream social policy in Brazil. Under president
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), and especially since Luiz Ina´cio
Lula da Silva took office in 2003, targeted assistance in education, health
and nutrition, now united under Bolsa Famı´lia, have expanded rapidly to
benefit forty-four million (24 per cent of the total population), absorbing
almost two-fifths of the social assistance budget earmarked for the poorest
sectors. Despite its operational problems, Bolsa Famı´lia appears to have been
effective in providing short-term relief to some of themost deprived groups in
Brazil. Yet it could prove to be a double-edged sword. There is a risk that, due
to its popularity among both the poor and Brazil’s politicians, Bolsa Famı´lia
could greatly increase patronage in the distribution of economic and social
benefits and induce a strong dependence on government handouts. There are
also early signs that it may be contributing to a reduction in social spending
in key sectors such as education, housing and basic sanitation, possibly
undermining the country’s future social and economic development.
INTRODUCTION
Brazil has enthusiastically embraced conditional cash transfer (CCT) pro-
grammes as part of mainstream social policy in the fight against poverty
and exclusion. Although this process started in the 1990s at sub-national
level, Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso or FHC (1995–2002) and es-
pecially Luiz Ina´cio ‘Lula’ da Silva (2003–) rapidly expanded and consoli-
dated a number of such schemes into what today is known as Bolsa Famı´lia
(Family Grant). This follows a major recent international trend in policy
making, especially evident in Latin America, towards constructing targeted
social safety nets to protect the poor (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; Hall and
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Midgley, 2004; ILO, 2006; Rawlings, 2004).1 CCT programmes have been
implemented in a number of middle-income countries apart from Brazil,
including Mexico (Progresa/Oportunidades), Chile (Chile Solidario),
Colombia (Familias en Accio´n), Argentina (Jefes de Hogar), Peru (Juntos),
Ecuador (Bono de Desarrollo Humano) and elsewhere.2
In part, the use of targeted safety nets and social funds has represented
a form of compensation for the adverse impacts upon the poor of sta-
bilization and structural adjustment policies implemented throughout the
1980s and 1990s (Conway, 2000; Cornia et al., 1987). In Latin Amer-
ica, social spending cutbacks under adjustment eroded the social pro-
tection infrastructure in a region where effective and universal welfare
systems had been developed in only a handful of countries.3 Furthermore,
the lion’s share of state subsidies in key areas such as health, education
and pensions was already monopolized by the middle and upper classes,
leaving little fiscal space for directly benefiting the poor more broadly
through redistributive social policies. The notion of providing universal
benefits and citizenship rights, with the exception of Cuba, has been es-
chewed in favour of selective provision based on politically determined
distribution by the state to more influential social groups (Abel and Lewis,
2002).
Conditional cash transfers have become increasingly popular for a num-
ber of reasons. They are designed to attack long-term poverty by making
payments conditional upon school attendance and participation in health
care, boosting effective demand and thus strengthening human capital in
an expression of joint responsibility between government and families. By
focusing on children and women, the expectation is that such measures
go well beyond offering relief and can attack the inter-generational trans-
mission of poverty by promoting synergies between education, health and
other sectors. They are seen as a more cost-effective means of reaching the
poor directly through efficient targeting while minimizing resource wastage.
In the words of one major World Bank study, cash transfers are seen as
‘an alternative to more traditional and paternalistic approaches to social
assistance’ (Rawlings, 2004: 6). Yet as will be discussed below, this re-
mains a highly contentious issue in Brazil and indeed elsewhere in Latin
America.
1. ‘Safety nets’ is a broad label for short-term, targeted measures aimed at vulnerable individ-
uals and households designed to mitigate the immediate effects of poverty and other risks.
Assistance may be provided in the form of one or a combination of cash, food, housing,
subsidies, fee waivers, scholarships and employment through public works programmes.
2. Some low-income countries have also been experimenting with CCTs on a smaller scale,
including Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Kenya, Lesotho, Mongolia, Honduras and
Pakistan (ILO, 2006).
3. Namely: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba and Uruguay (Abel and Lewis, 2002).
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SOCIAL SPENDING AND CASH TRANSFERS IN BRAZIL
Before examining the evolution and performance of Bolsa Famı´lia and its
predecessors in Brazil, it is revealing to examine the evolution of spending
on CCTs within the overall social budget. Total social expenditure in Brazil
stands at almost 13 per cent of GDP (Table 1). During 2006, social security
including pensions accounted for around 69 per cent of total social spending,
health 14 per cent and education 6 per cent. Around 44 per cent is absorbed by
pensions alone (compared with 33 per cent on average for OECD countries),
a figure exceeded only by Mexico and Italy (Brazil, 2005a, 2005b; IPEA,
2006a).
‘Social assistance’ directed at the poorest remains a relatively small pro-
portion of the total budget at some 7.5 per cent, with Bolsa Famı´lia account-
ing for two-fifths of this amount, or 2.9 per cent of total social expenditure.
What is noticeable, however, is that there has been a steady expansion since
the late 1990s in social spending for the poorest through general programmes
and for cash transfers in particular (Table 1; Fig. 1). While social spending
increased in real terms by 23 per cent between 2001 and 2004, direct income
transfers of all kinds expanded at the significantly higher rate of 29 per cent
(Lavinas, 2006). Under FHC (1995–2002) social assistance spending for the
poor rose to 5.6 per cent (R$ 10.2 billion) of the total social budget. This
grew significantly to 7.5 per cent (R$ 22 billion) under Lula by 2006.
The increase in spending on CCTs over this period has been even more
marked. In 2002, the final year of the FHC administration, these accounted
for almost one-quarter of spending on the poor (R$ 2.4 billion). Expenditure
on CCTs rose sharply from 2003 to 2004 with the inauguration of Bolsa
Famı´lia and by 2006, the last year of Lula’s first government, this had
increased significantly to take up 38 per cent (R$ 8.2 billion) of the social
assistance budget, aimed at the poorest groups. Overall, spending on CCTs
grew from less than 1 per cent of the total social budget in 2001 to 2.9 per cent
in 2006. Under Lula, spending on Bolsa Famı´lia increased from 0.2 to 0.5
per cent of GDP by 2005 (Lindert, 2005). It would thus be fair to say that the
rhetoric of increased financial support for the poor which has characterized
President Lula’s electoral campaigning and policy platform has indeed been
matched by actual spending, at least as far as CCTs are concerned. Yet to
keep matters in perspective, it should be borne in mind that these conditional
cash payments remain a small percentage of total social spending and are,
for example, far outweighed by pensions.4
FOME ZERO: THE EARLY DAYS
As Brazil’s first working-class President, with a long history of trade union
activity and opposition to military dictatorship behind him, Lula owed his
4. Pensions account for 82 per cent of cash transfers in Brazil although, unlike CCTs, they are
highly regressive.
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Figure 1. Trends in Funding for Social Assistance and CCTs, Brazil,
2001–2006
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rise to power in large measure to support from less privileged sectors of
society. He projected (and continues to project) a strong image of personal
commitment to addressing the needs of poorer Brazilians. On taking office
in January 2003, President Lula nailed his colours firmly to the mast when
he famously declared that: ‘If by the end of my term of office every Brazilian
has enough food to eat three times a day, I shall have fulfilled my mission
in life’. Early in the Lula administration, Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) was
announced to mark out the Workers’ Party (PT) as socially progressive and
determined to attack poverty head-on.5
Despite the fanfare with which Fome Zero was launched, it was in fact
an umbrella term for several programmes that had already been developed
under the administration of Lula’s predecessor, President FernandoHenrique
Cardoso. These federal schemes had in turn evolved from earlier national
5. Fome Zero was the brainchild of Jose´ Graziano da Silva, former professor of agrarian
studies at the University of Campinas, Sa˜o Paulo, and appointed by Lula to head the new
Ministry of Food Security and Fight against Hunger.
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and state-level initiatives implemented during the 1990s.6 Re-packaged as
Fome Zero, four federal schemes were brought together under a single label:
the flagship Bolsa Escola for boosting school attendance, Bolsa Alimentac¸a˜o
for maternal nutrition, the PETI programme7 against child labour and the
Auxı´lio Ga´s cooking gas subsidy. A new food entitlement scheme known as
Carta˜o Alimentac¸a˜o was added, which uses a special electronic card for the
purchase of selected food items.
Bolsa Escola (School Grant) was the highest profile sub-programme, ac-
counting for the bulk of spending. It providedmotherswith amonthly stipend
per child enrolled in return for their children attending school at least 85 per
cent of the time. It had its origins in local school grant schemes implemented
in Campinas, Sa˜o Paulo and in the federal district of Brası´lia during the
mid-1990s, and was adopted nationally in 2001. By 2003 it had spread to
nearly all of Brazil’s 5,561 municipalities, disbursing over US$ 500 million
in grants to over 5 million families with 8.6 million children.
Consolidation of these safety net programmes under Fome Zero brought
some innovations, however. Implementation of the programme was decen-
tralized to municipal level in an attempt to promote greater efficiency, trans-
parency and accountability, while the introduction of a food card systemwas
meant to help eliminate fraud. The private sector also became involved as
major companies such as Ford and Unilever, as well as supermarket chains,
were invited to contribute in a gesture of corporate social responsibility.
At the same time, international donors such as the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank moved speedily to publicly endorse
Lula’s strong anti-poverty stance.Fome Zerofitted in nicelywith an emerging
international body of intellectual and financial support for the construction
of safety nets as a major arm of social policy, adherence to which belied the
PT administration’s radical ‘left-leaning’ image. In the wake of the collapse
of the Soviet Union and comprehensive social security schemes, along with
the Asian crisis, targeted social protection measures couched in the terms
of ‘social risk management’ became mainstreamed. In addition to providing
short-term relief, CCT and similar schemes would strengthen livelihoods
and build human capital as a ‘springboard’ for development (World Bank,
2000).8
Yet despite the initial enthusiasm for Fome Zero both at home and abroad,
only a few months into the Lula administration disillusionment set in due
6. From 1993–2000 a food parcel distribution programme (cestas ba´sicas – PRODEA) was
designed to provide for family needs for one month but was heavily criticized for being
unashamedly clientelistic in its use for vote-capturing. In addition, smaller CCT projects
had been undertaken in a number of state capitals from 1995 (Graziano da Silva et al.,
2005).
7. Programa de Erradica˜o do Trabalho Infantil (Plan to Eradicate Child Labour).
8. In 2000 the World Bank set up its Social Protection Unit within the Human Development
Network. By 2005, social protection accounted for 12 per cent of total Bank lending, with
US$ 2.5 billion invested in forty-five projects around the globe (World Bank, 2005).
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to a number of serious problems with the programme. The sub-projects
operated independently of each other with no overall co-ordination, separate
administrative structures, beneficiary selection methods, reporting proce-
dures and banking arrangements.9 The unified data base inherited from the
previous administration covered only 70 per cent of beneficiaries, resulting
in widely acknowledged targeting errors and omissions, duplication and high
implementation costs. Furthermore, there were widespread accusations of
political manipulation in the selection of beneficiaries, harking back to the
earlier cesta ba´sica food distribution scheme of the 1990s. A new approach
was urgently required.
BOLSA FAMI´LIA IS BORN
With its credibility in the fight against hunger and poverty seriously
undermined, in October 2003 the four separate schemes were unified under
the new label of Bolsa Famı´lia (Family Grant), now the largest CCT pro-
gramme in the world.10 In 2006, the existing PETI anti-child labour scheme
was added. Aside from strengthening administrative and targeting efficiency,
it was hoped that this fusion would enhance synergies and complementar-
ities at the family level in schooling, health and nutrition. Conditionalities
for these three aspects were merged while unit benefits were increased. The
household was defined as the operational unit and the female head became
the targeted beneficiary. In January 2004, the Ministry of Food Security and
Fight against Hunger was merged with the Ministry of Social Welfare to
form the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS).
Jose´ Graziano da Silva was replaced by Patrus Ananias as Minister of Social
Development and the Bolsa Famı´lia management unit was transferred from
the President’s Office to the MDS to facilitate integration and co-ordination.
Bolsa Famı´lia targets two groups on the basis of self-declared household
income: the ‘very poor’ with a monthly income of up to R$ 60 (US$ 36) and
the ‘poor’ earning between R$ 60.01 and R$ 120 (US$ 73) a month.11 The
extremely poor now receive a flat payment of R$ 58 (US$ 35) per month
regardless of household composition. Both groups have been eligible for
monthly payments per child up to fifteen years of age to a maximum of three
children. In December 2007 this limit was extended to include another two
children per family up to age seventeen. The maximum monthly stipend per
family now stands at R$ 172 (about US$ 104), although some families still
9. Bolsa Escola (Ministry of Education), Bolsa Alimentac¸a˜o (Ministry of Health), Carta˜o
Alimenta˜o (Fome Zero), Auxı´lio Ga´s (Ministry of Mines and Energy).
10. The Fome Zero label was retained to embrace Brazil’s overall safety net programme involv-
ing some thirty projects in the areas of food security, farming and other forms of support.
http://www.fomezero.gov.br
11. Figures are based on an exchange rate of US$ 1 = R$ 1.65 at the time of writing in May
2008.
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receive additional benefits inherited from Fome Zero’s separately adminis-
tered programmes.12 Cash payments are conditional upon proof of regular
school attendance, children’s vaccination, visits to health clinics and other
activities such as participation in nutrition and vocational training courses.
The Auxı´lio Ga´s subsidy provides the same poor families with R$ 15 (US$ 9)
every two months to purchase cooking gas cylinders. The food card system
Carta˜o Alimentac¸a˜o was introduced in the Northeast, Brazil’s poorest re-
gion, providing a further monthly supplement of R$ 50 (US$ 30) for basic
food purchases. Although these payments may seem modest to the outside
observer, they nevertheless represent a substantial boost to the household
incomes of large sections of Brazil’s poorest groups.13
Following the restructuring of Brazil’s safety net programmes, interna-
tional support was rapidly forthcoming. A few months later in June 2004,
the World Bank approved a US$ 572 million sector-wide loan to support
Bolsa Famı´lia. It provides funding for cash transfers (96 per cent) as well
as technical assistance to develop a unified database, improve targeting, de-
velop a system for monitoring and evaluation and strengthen institutional
capacity within the MDS (World Bank, 2004). Later that year, the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) approved a loan of US$ 1 billion for
the programme, with a promise of up to twice this amount depending on
progress (IDB, 2004). These two commitments totalling US$ 2.57 billion
represent almost one-quarter of the estimated funding of R$ 23 billion for
Bolsa Famı´lia during the first Lula administration of 2003–06 (Table 1).
By any standards this is a very firm international endorsement of the CCT
approach to poverty reduction in Brazil.
Achievements
In numerical terms, the achievements of Bolsa Famı´lia are impressive.
Figure 2 shows the steady rise in numbers of beneficiaries from 2001
to 2007. By the end of 2006, the programme had met its target of at-
tending to the needs of 11.1 poor families or some 44 million Brazilians
(MDS, 2007). While numerically impressive, however, the latest figures
show that this equates to just 40 per cent of the eligible population (Soares
et al., 2007). According to MDS data, in June 2006 alone, just three
months before the Presidential elections, 1.8 million families joined the pro-
gramme, concentrated in the more deprived Northeast of the country (FSP,
2006c).14 Over half of these recruits had received no other federal transfers
12. http://www.mds.gov.br/ (accessed 23 May 2008)
13. Stipends in Brazil are comparable with CCT payments in other countries such as Mexico
and Colombia (de la Brie`re and Rawlings, 2006).
14. This was facilitated by increasing the qualifying household income level from R$ 100 to
R$ 120 and updating of the municipal database of eligible families (FSP, 2006c).
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Figure 2. Growth in the Number of Families Benefiting from Major Cash
Transfer Programmes (Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Famı´lia), Brazil,
2001–2007 (millions)
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until then. Furthermore, the average level of benefit paid per household
almost tripled from R$ 28 to R$ 75 per month from 2003–05 (Brazil,
2005a).
According to the World Bank, Bolsa Famı´lia is not only the largest but
also the best targeted CCT scheme in Latin America, with 73 per cent of
benefits reaching the poorest 20 per cent of the population, and 94 per cent
falling within the lowest two quintiles (FAO, 2006).15 Many which had in
the past often been excluded from receiving social benefits such as street
dwellers, quilombola16 communities and even indigenous groups have also
been drawn into the safety net for the first time.
Notwithstanding the more outlandish claims by some politicians and
policy-makers, the evidence suggests that in Brazil CCT programmes have
been effective in helping to reduce poverty and inequality. The first par-
tial evaluations of direct impacts produced mixed results. A study was
made in four north-eastern municipalities over eighteen months of the
impact of Bolsa Alimentac¸a˜o, which gives mothers a stipend of R$ 25
15. Compared with Chile (58 per cent), Nicaragua (55 per cent), Honduras (43 per cent),
Dominican Republic (35 per cent), Mexico (32 per cent) and Argentina (32 per cent).
16. Communities composed of the descendents of runaway slaves, typically established in
relatively isolated areas of the Northeast and North of the country.
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(US$ 15) conditional upon regular attendance at health clinics. It was
found that the project had strengthened the food security and nutritional
status of mothers and children compared with non-participants (Brazil,
2004).
Another investigation into the early Bolsa Escola (School Grant) com-
ponent when it was implemented in selected municipalities in the 1990s
found that it improved school attendance and had a minor but positive im-
pact on poverty levels (Bourguignon et al., 2003). However, the scheme
had no significant effect on child labour as the economic incentive was
perceived by families as being too small (Cardoso and Souza, 2003). Fur-
ther research concluded that Bolsa Escola, which is aimed at children aged
six to fifteen years, had been poorly targeted. Most dropping out starts at
age fourteen, the study concluded, and it would thus be in the fourteen
to seventeen age group in which a cash incentive could be most effec-
tive in retaining children at school (Schwartzman, 2005). This error has
now been corrected with the inclusion of adolescents up to the age of
seventeen.
A process evaluation of Bolsa Escola, as it was implemented during
2004 in four states of Northeast Brazil in 261 municipalities, revealed the
highly variable record of local authorities in terms of operational efficiency
(de Janvry et al., 2005). While there is no information on impacts as such,
the assessment was quite positive in terms of the transparency of procedures
adopted for beneficiary screening and selection, although it was also found
that this did not necessarily lead to greater accountability.
A more recent and comprehensive baseline study commissioned by the
World Bank found that Bolsa Famı´lia produced no major variations in
consumption levels in the sample group but noted increased consumption of
food, educational materials and children’s clothing (Soares et al., 2007).17
Other results include a 3.6 per cent increase in school attendance and a lower
drop-out rate amongst beneficiaries. However, there was found to have been
little impact on child nutrition, especially in the critical twelve to thirty-six
month age group. Labour market participation was also found on average to
be 2.6 per cent higher amongst Bolsa Famı´lia participants, and 4.3 per cent
higher amongst women. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the programme
has given a significant boost to the local economies of areas which benefit
from these cash transfers (IPEA, 2008). There are, therefore, some promising
indications that the programme could have more beneficial economic spin-
off than is sometimes assumed. It has also been strongly suggested that
the success of Bolsa Familia in reaching the poorest sectors resulted in a
17. The same study notes, however, that this appears to have been at the expense of health items
and adults’ clothing purchases. The evaluation, carried out by CEDEPLAR of the Federal
University of Minas Gerais, administered 15,240 questionnaires in 269 municipalities
(MDS, 2007).
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one-third reduction in land invasions by the MST landless movement during
President Lula’s first administration.18
In addition, there is evidence that cash transfer programmes have helped
reduce levels of income inequality in Brazil. One major study noted that
declining levels of poverty and inequality in Brazil since the 1980s are in
part associated with the spread of non-contributory rural pensions and other
cash-based social assistance programmes (Menezes-Filho andVasconcellos,
2007). Independent research evidence from Sa˜o Paulo also found that
CCTs, including Bolsa Famı´lia, have been effective in targeting the poorest
groups.19 Since the 1990s there has been a gradual fall in the proportion of the
population considered poor, but the drop has been especially marked since
2003 with the establishment of Bolsa Famı´lia. From 2003 to 2005, there
was a fall in absolute poverty in Brazil of over 19 per cent. Furthermore,
from 2001 to 2004, the poorest 10 per cent of Brazilians enjoyed an increase
in household income of 23.5 per cent, while the richest experienced a drop
of 7.5 per cent. Based on household survey data, it has been estimated that
income inequality in Brazil fell by 4 per cent from 2001–04 (IPEA, 2006b).
Furthermore, it is claimed that between 1995 and 2004, CCTs have helped
reduce the Gini coefficient of income inequality by 21 per cent, comparable
with results obtained by similar programmes in Mexico and Chile (Soares
et al., 2007). These changes have been attributed to a number of factors
including lower inflation rates, increases in the legal minimum wage and
pensions indexed to the minimum wage as well as to the effects of targeted
safety nets such as Bolsa Familia (IPEA, 2006b; Neri, 2006).
Notwithstanding this cautiously constructive judgement, the same study
shed light on a number of operational problems with Bolsa Escola that
have subsequently appeared in connection with the wider Bolsa Famı´lia
programme. Clear evidence was found of political manipulation, with over
a quarter of members of ‘social control councils’ (conselhos) themselves
being direct beneficiaries of the programme, implying a major conflict of
interest.20 Furthermore, in 10 per cent of municipalities surveyed, one or
more members of the legislature were programme beneficiaries, giving rise
to the conclusion that, ‘mayors used the Bolsa Escola program in exchange
for support in the legislative branch. . .(and). . .the allocation of these bolsas
is used as an explicit element of clientelism and political rents’ (de Janvry
et al., 2005: 29–30). The same study found that one-fifth of municipalities
18. According to research carried out by the State University of Sa˜o Paulo, the number of
families involved in land occupations by the MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadoes Rurais
Sem Terra) fell from 65,552 in 2003 to 44,364 in 2006 (FSP, 2007c; IPEA, 2008).
19. Primary data collected by CEBRAP revealed that 95 per cent of CCT beneficiaries in Sa˜o
Paulo came from the poorest sectors (Figueiredo et al., 2006).
20. These conselhos were set up at municipal level to monitor implementation of social pro-
grammes and induce a degree of transparency and accountability. They comprise represen-
tatives from the community and authorities and in many instances members are nominated
by the mayor, to whom they are not infrequently related (de Janvry et al., 2005).
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sampled had no council to monitor activities, despite the fact that this was a
legal requirement.
Monitoring of adherence to conditionalities has also been a contentious
issue. In order to be effective in strengthening human capital, CCT benefits
are contingent upon mothers meeting their obligations by sending their chil-
dren regularly to school as well as undergoing health screening and receiv-
ing vaccinations, etc. Without such reciprocity, it could be argued that cash
transfers are merely a form of thinly disguised charity designed primarily to
capture votes. It is claimed in official figures that 80 per cent of Bolsa Escola
recipients are monitored for school attendance and that a 97 per cent success
rate has been registered, although the evidence is mixed.21 In contrast, just
42 per cent of adherence to health conditionalities has been tracked (IPEA,
2008). Independent research notes that school teachers have been reluctant
to register absentee pupils, although this has improved more recently under
Bolsa Famı´lia (de Janvry et al., 2005). Social councils have been unwilling
to perform a policing role, especially where their independence is compro-
mised by local personal and political links. One independent study was quite
categorical in its assessment of this aspect of Bolsa Famı´lia: ‘The federal
government is unable to supervise the behaviour of poor families through-
out the country; local governments and municipalities are either inefficient
or tied up with local elites, or both; and community grassroots organiza-
tions are easily captured by political parties and movements’ (Schwartzman,
2005: 25). It is hoped that further evaluation will shed light on whether such
obligations and the transaction costs involved are eventually reflected in a
strengthening of human development indicators.
A major objective of Bolsa Famı´lia is to target women and children more
directly to ensure that they secure maximum benefit; hence the policy of
channelling cash transfers through female heads of household. The baseline
study quoted above notes some subtle changes in household dynamics as
a consequence (MDS, 2007; IPEA, 2008). It is claimed that women have
becomemore ‘empowered’ through the increase in purchasing power gained
and have thus experienced a strengthening of their authority in the household.
Moreover, women participants consider that their citizenship rights have
been strengthened as a result of having gone through the process of acquiring
the official papers (such as an identity card or birth certificate) necessary to
register for the programme.
BOLSA FAMI´LIA IN CONTEXT
Operational questions aside, there are wider issues to be considered relating
to the effectiveness of Bolsa Famı´lia in seriously challenging poverty in
such an unequal society. Major questions to be considered include: (i) the
21. This is based on a minimum attendance rate of 85 per cent of the time.
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short- to medium-term poverty impact of Bolsa Famı´lia; (ii) use of CCTs as
an instrument of political clientelism and patronage; (iii) growing economic
dependence of the poor on government handouts, together with a lack of
integration between CCTs and employment creation; and (v) the possible
opportunity costs in terms of reduced longer-term human capital and social
investment.
Poverty and Inequality
Although further evaluation evidence is needed to assess poverty impacts in
greater detail, the popular enthusiasm which has greeted the programme tes-
tifies clearly to the fact that it has boosted household incomes of those on the
lowest rungs of the social ladder. In Sa˜o Paulo, survey data for 2004 revealed
that 19 per cent of the population had access to CCTs, which accounted for
21 per cent of household income amongst the poorest groups (Figueiredo et
al., 2006). This is an especially significant contribution to people’s liveli-
hoods as urban employment is becoming increasingly informal, irregular
and diversified. In Northeast Brazil, one-third of all households receive cash
transfers, including Bolsa Famı´lia, a figure which rises to 44 per cent in rural
areas.
It has been suggested that Bolsa Famı´lia and other CCTs may thus be
contributing to a gradual reduction in absolute levels of poverty. One study
indicated that 35 per cent of the drop in income inequality in Brazil ob-
served between 2001 and 2004 was attributable to the expansion of cash
transfer programmes (IPEA, 2006b). This may in part be attributable to more
recent programmes such as Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Famı´lia. However, the
introduction in 1991 of non-contributory pensions (worth a full minimum
salary, substantially more than CCT payments) has probably had a more
substantial anti-poverty impact (Menezes-Filho and Vasconcellos, 2007).
Nevertheless, evaluation results from comparable CCT programmes such
as Oportunidades in Mexico (the second largest in the world after Bolsa
Famı´lia) strongly suggest that, if properly implemented, they are an effec-
tive instrument for reducing absolute poverty and improving some social
indicators in a relatively short space of time.22
Yet the redistributive potential of CCTs such as Brazil’s must be kept
within a realistic perspective. Brazil has the seventh most unequal income
distribution in the world, in which the top 20 per cent of the population
earns almost two-thirds of personal income and the bottom quintile just
2.3 per cent (Paes de Barros and Carvalho, 2003). Although a drop in income
22. Initiated in 1997, Progresa/Oportunidades has been successful in reducing household
poverty, boosting school enrolments and reducing dropouts, stimulating higher levels of
household consumption, improving child nutrition and cutting child labour (de Britto, 2008;
Molyneux, 2006; Skoufias, 2005).
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inequality was registered from 2001 to 2004 in Brazil, as noted above, there
has been a steady rise in urban poverty since the 1990s. In 1995 some 13 per
cent of the urban population lived in absolute poverty, rising to 15 per cent
in 2004 (Torres et al., 2006).23 Some 40 per cent of Brazilians (72 million
people of a total 184 million) are classed as still living below the unofficial
poverty line of one-half of the legal minimum salary (Jaccoud, 2006).24
Some economists argue that increases in the legal minimum wage across
the board are far more effective than targeted cash transfers in attacking
poverty. One study concluded that wage rises and employment generation
had accounted for 78 per cent of the reduction in income inequality in
Brazil from 1995 to 2004, while income transfer programmes accounted
for the remaining 22 per cent, with Bolsa Familia alone responsible for
three-quarters of this reduction (Soares et al., 2006).
As far as poverty alleviation in the longer-term is concerned, a major criti-
cism of cash transfers is that on their own they have a limited impact because
they are channelled into basic consumption and do not boost income-earning
capacity or household assets. This is probably true of the vast majority of
CCTs around the globe, including Brazil’s, although exceptions have been
noted in the cases of Mexico and Chile, for example (Rawlings, 2004). Re-
formers aiming to strengthen the impact of Bolsa Famı´lia should examine
experiences in other countries where this challenge has been addressed. In
Bangladesh, for example, BRAC’s ‘Targeting the Ultra-poor’ (TUP) pro-
gramme launched in 2002 adopts a livelihoods perspective. Building upon
earlier social protection programmes, it now combines a one-off transfer
with asset-building activities and economic promotion schemes (Hulme and
Moore, 2008).
Politicization of Bolsa Famı´lia
Targeted safety nets are conventionally treated as a tool of technocratic plan-
ning but it is widely recognized that in practice they have a strong political
dimension. This has been underlined as a perfectly rational course of ac-
tion, since ‘a policymaker who accurately takes into account the reaction of
voters to targeting can always do better than one who ignores electoral pol-
itics’ (Pritchett, 2005: 4). It is openly acknowledged even by President Lula
himself that his electoral triumph in 2006 to win a second term was due in
large measure to the success of Bolsa Famı´lia. In the run-up to the election,
public opinion polls consistently showed that his popularity was growing
fastest amongst populations benefiting from the programme; that is, among
23. Absolute poverty is defined in this source as a per capita income of up to half of the
minimum salary. Brazil’s ten largest metropolitan regions were covered in the survey.
24. As of 1 March 2008, the legal minimum salary stood at R$ 415 (US$ 251) per month.
Figures are based on data from the National Household survey (PNAD).
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the poorest groups generally, and especially in the Northeast.25 There was a
large expansion of the programme just three months before the election in
order to meet the final target of over eleven million households.26 Unsur-
prisingly, cases were reported in the press of the scheme being unashamedly
used by local authorities for vote-capturing purposes.27
This particularly strong political support for Lula amongst Bolsa Famı´lia
beneficiaries was confirmed in subsequent voting patterns in October 2006.
In northeast Brazil, where up to half of households receive Bolsa Famı´lia
stipends in some areas, the President won between 56 and 80 per cent
of the vote by state, surpassing levels of support gained in 2002 (FSP,
2006e; Power, 2006). Indeed, so popular is the scheme that even opposition
politicians vehemently supported Bolsa Famı´lia, promising to expand it
further still should they be victorious.28 For any contender to openly criticize
Bolsa Famı´lia during campaigning would have constituted an act of political
suicide.
Lula has played the populist card well, identifying himself with Bolsa
Famı´lia and portraying it as his personal ‘gift’ to the deprived, claiming
that ‘never has a government concerned itself so much with the poor’ (FSP,
2006d). This tactic may well have been essential for the President to capture
votes in the context of the decline in popularity of the Workers’ Party (PT)
in the wake of several corruption scandals. This drove Lula to bypass the
party structure and appeal directly to the poor, distancing himself from an
increasingly discredited PT. In the words of one political scientist, this was
a logical strategy to compensate for ‘the absence of a political project struc-
tured within social movements and mass organisations which has sustained
the PT since its foundations’ (Flynn, 2005: 1245). The President’s humble
origins in the Northeast and role as a workers’ leader, his personal charisma
and popular appeal, together with his formidable communications skills,
made such a choice that much more feasible.
It is hardly surprising that CCT programmes such as Bolsa Famı´lia should
be politicized in view of their ability to rapidly benefit large and electorally
important sectors of the population. Indeed, this broad principle applies not
25. As early as eight months before the October 2006 presidential election, Datafolha polls
registered a rise in electoral support for Lula to 48 per cent, just as Bolsa Famı´lia was being
expanded to reach its target population of forty-four million. In the poor Northeast region,
support for Lula stood at 55 per cent, compared with 29 per cent in the wealthier Southeast
of the country. While Lula had an eight point lead in the polls in the Northeast overall, he
enjoyed a twenty-one point advantage among Bolsa Famı´lia beneficiaries (FSP, 2006b).
26. In June 2006 alone, about 1.8 million families (around 16 per cent of the total target) joined
the scheme, one million of whom had received no cash transfers previously. Most were
recruited from Sa˜o Paulo and the more northerly states of Bahia, Pernambuco, Ceara´ and
Maranha˜o as well as Minas Gerais (FSP, 2006c).
27. In one town the mayor sent a letter to all Bolsa Famı´lia recipients explaining that this was
a personal initiative of the president himself (FSP, 2006a).
28. For example, Lula’s main opponent in 2006, Geraldo Alkmin (PSDB), while campaigning
in the Northeast, declared his unqualified support for Bolsa Famı´lia (ESP, 2006b).
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just to developing countries but also to higher income, industrialized nations
where the politicization and institutionalization of welfare provisioning on
the policy agenda is generally welcomed as a sign of progress. Indeed,
‘politicized’ social policy, especially where it contains a strong redistributive
element, may help stimulate economic growth and consolidate democracy
through the social inclusion of traditionally ignored poorer groups. Be that
as it may, however, a key question in the context of developing countries
concerns the nature of this process and in what ways the politicization of
social policy, CCTs in this case, might serve to actually undermine longer-
term policy formulation and planning.
In the case of Brazil, the sheer popularity of Bolsa Famı´lia could serve to
promote a short-term perspective among politicians and policy makers, en-
couraging them to employ it primarily as a relatively inexpensive yet highly
effective mechanism for capturing votes. As discussed below, some critics
accuse Bolsa Famı´lia of encouraging a ‘culture of dependence’ amongst the
poor. In turn, there is a corresponding danger that longer-term policy prior-
ities for investing in basic social infrastructure, especially in key areas such
as education and health, might suffer. There could be a financial opportunity
cost if resources are switched from social investments to income transfers,
although this remains to be clearly demonstrated, as noted below.
A ‘Culture of Dependence’?
The effectiveness of CCT programmes such as Bolsa Famı´lia in reduc-
ing poverty in the short term must be set against the inherent dangers of
encouraging further dependence of the poor on government handouts and
transfers. The potential political leverage available through cash transfers is
underlined by the fact that average total monthly payments through Bolsa
Famı´lia now amount to almost R$ 900 million or US$ 545 million (FSP, 18
March 2008). Some municipalities rely on the programme for up to 40 per
cent of their overall budgets, with such dependence being especially strong
in poorer north-eastern districts (Marques, 2005). Patrus Ananias, the Min-
ister of Social Development, even accused some mayors of establishing a
‘poverty industry’. That is, they would refrain from imposing local land and
housing taxes in order to retain popular support, confident that the federal
government would make up any budget deficit via cash transfers of various
kinds, including CCTs (ESP, 2006a).
Not just mayors but also individuals and households appear to be in-
creasingly dependent on federal transfers, including on CCTs. Longitudinal
studies of the labour market and household incomes in Sa˜o Paulo have re-
vealed the growing informalization of employment in Brazil’s largest city
(Figueiredo et al., 2005). In 1991, 54 per cent of workers were formally
registered, compared with only 30 per cent in 2004, while the informal sec-
tor doubled in size to 51 per cent over the same period. Even at that stage,
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the CCT precursors of Bolsa Famı´lia, as noted above, accounted for 21 per
cent of family income amongst the poorest sectors in Sa˜o Paulo. In 1995
according to census data, earnings from employment accounted for almost
90 per cent of household income in Brazil but by 2004 this figure had fallen
to 48 per cent (FSP, 2005). In other words, Brazil’s poorest families now
derive over half their income from federal, largely non-contributory cash
transfers, including Bolsa Famı´lia and rural pensions.
In the face of continued high structural unemployment amongst the poor
this trend may be inevitable and will be reversed only when the economy is
able to generate more jobs. It does not follow, therefore, that cash transfers
are necessarily displacing paid work and encouraging ‘idleness’. In fact,
three-quarters of those in receipt of income transfers in Brazil are employed
(‘economically active’), an almost identical proportion to that of the wider
population. However, unemployment is significantly higher amongst cash
transfer recipients in urban areas (Jaccoud, 2006).29 The targeted andmeans-
tested nature of Bolsa Famı´lia could certainly stimulate a move towards
informal employment since to accept paid formal jobs could disqualify
beneficiaries.30 In order to discourage such a trend and reinforce formal
employment, there is thus an argument in favour of universalizing Bolsa
Famı´lia and removing the means-tested element, as noted in the conclusions
below.
Harsher critics have labelled Bolsa Famı´lia/Bolsa Escola as ‘Bolsa
Esmola’ (‘charity’ or ‘alms’) on the grounds that such transfers, especially
where conditionalities are only loosely monitored, are merely an exercise
in paternalism which encourages clientelism and manipulation for electoral
ends. This would encourage the use of CCTs for short-term political gain and
belie their supposed ‘social risk management’ aim to address longer-term
development challenges through investment in livelihoods and the enhance-
ment of human capital. This is not to say that short-term political aims and
longer-run development objectives are necessarily incompatible. However,
the temptation is to spend heavily on interventions to reward households for
their immediate partisan support rather than investing in activities whose
benefits will become apparent only several years down the line, well past
the election date, and for which another political leader may even eventually
claim credit.
29. Household survey (PNAD) data for 2001–04 reveal that formal employment amongst the
general population stands at 28 per cent, compared with 15 per cent for cash transfer
recipients. Informal and other forms of self-employment account for 40 per cent of the
general labour force, but 64 per cent amongst income transfer beneficiaries (Jaccoud,
2006).
30. Anecdotal evidence suggests that temporary rural workers in particular are reluctant to
become registered and receive a legal minimum salary for a few months a year since
under current regulations this would disqualify them from receiving Bolsa Famı´lia benefits
altogether. See FSP (2007b).
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The ‘social riskmanagement’ approach to safety nets requires that ‘spring-
boards’ be created to go beyond the provision of short-term relief, enhancing
people’s livelihoods and creating jobs (World Bank, 2000). However, CCTs
have not been very successful to date in forging links with productive em-
ployment. Some programmes have adopted a more integrated approach as
in Nicaragua, Mexico and Chile’s Programa Puente, as well as in some
state-level programmes in Brazil itself (Hall, 2006; Rawlings, 2004). The
longer-term success of CCTs in fighting poverty, it is recognized, ‘depends
on insertion into the wider economy, notably through rural employment and
labor market policies’ (de la Brie`re and Rawlings, 2006: 25). Social protec-
tion and transfer payments ‘can be growth-promoting where, for instance, it
stimulates thrift and credit schemes, creates physical assets through employ-
ment schemes, and promotes personal insurance’ (Farrington et al., 2004: v).
The notion of ‘Transformative Social Protection’ argues that social policies
can be a powerful tool for strengthening livelihoods (IDS, 2006). However,
this remains to be demonstrated in the case of CCTs such as Bolsa Famı´lia.
Social Investment
Since its inception in 2003, Bolsa Famı´lia has absorbed a small but growing
proportion of Brazil’s overall social spending. Although this remains modest
at just under 3 per cent, there is a risk that the imperative to make short-
term electoral gains could compromise longer-term social investments in key
areas such as education, health and sanitation. The emphasis on strengthening
demand by the poor for health and education will not necessarily lead to
an improvement in the supply or quality of these services, especially as
public provision is frequently unresponsive to such pressures (Farrington
and Slater, 2006). Furthermore, eventual success in strengthening human
capital through Bolsa Famı´lia might be used perversely to actually justify
lower levels of investment into basic education and health infrastructure
in future on the grounds that poverty and inequality can be tackled most
effectively through safety nets (Handa and Davis, 2006).
Independent research indicates that the notable expansion in non-
contributory benefits in Brazil through CCTs and other welfare programmes
has been accompanied by a significant drop in longer-term social investment
in several sectors. For example, between 2002 and 2004, federal spending
on basic sanitation and housing fell in real terms by 46 per cent. Over
the same period at state level, investment in education saw a reduction of
12 per cent, housing by 14 per cent and basic sanitation by 18 per cent. Very
similar results were recorded for social investments by municipal govern-
ments in terms both of overall as well as per capita spending (Lavinas et al.,
2006). Other research noted that federal spending per capita between 2001
and 2005 fell significantly in sanitation (44 per cent), health (7.49 per cent)
and education (5.4 per cent) while social assistance for the poorest grew by
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11.11 per cent (Pochmann, 2005). It was concluded that: ‘there has been
no coordinated effort at federal or sub-national levels to provide essential
public services indispensable for the reduction of inequalities in lifestyle and
improvements in welfare alongside improvements in individual and family
income and consumption’ (Lavinas et al., 2006: 7).
It is also significant that, in a round of government spending cuts in
early 2007, the Ministry of Social Development fared well. It maintained its
budget virtually intact, whereas others faced reductions of up to 77 per
cent.31 This attests to the continuing high political importance attached to
targeted social safety nets in Brazil. Whether the promotion of such cash
stipends induces spending cutbacks in longer-term social investments either
directly or indirectly remains to be seen. Another moot point concerns the
impact of politically strategic CCTs such as Bolsa Famı´lia on the mind-set of
policy planners. There could be subtle but serious consequences for national
progress if short-term electoral preoccupations come to dominate thinking
at the expense of pushing forward critical sector investment programmes
essential for longer-term economic growth and social development. Cash
transfers can only complement and not substitute mainstream social provi-
sioning. Moreover, they can themselves only function properly in terms of
strengthening demand for and democratizing access to basic social services
such as education and health if the actual supply of such services is adequate
in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Bolsa Famı´lia and other conditional cash transfer programmes have been
hailed by many policy makers as something of a ‘magic bullet’ for rapidly
reducing levels of absolute poverty while attempting to improve social in-
dicators through increasing the effective demand for education and health
care. Such schemes have proved extremely popular amongst national policy
makers of all ideological persuasions due to the electoral support which can
be harnessed. Furthermore, programmes which are apparently effective in
attacking urban poverty, especially those which help keep poor children in
school, are likely to gain the approval of wealthier citizens concerned with
personal and public security. CCTs have also attracted growing technical and
financial support from international donors as they appear to offer a ‘win–
win’, highly visible and relatively conflict-free approach for addressingmass
poverty.
Yet, as we have seen, there are inherent dangers which threaten to un-
dermine the longer-term effectiveness and viability of CCTs as a means of
31. The Ministry of Social Development suffered a cut of just 2.5 per cent, compared with
Tourism (77 per cent), Cities (59 per cent), Agriculture (45 per cent), Transport (23 per
cent), Defence (17 per cent) and Justice (19 per cent). See FSP (2007a).
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addressing deep-seated poverty and deprivation. These risks include opera-
tional problems of targeting and general effectiveness in reducing poverty,
the quest for short-term political advantage at the expense of longer-run
investment into social infrastructure, a lack of integration with labour mar-
kets, and the resulting creation of a dependency culture which might further
encourage clientelism in the distribution of benefits and informalization of
the labour market itself.
Insofar as safety nets are considered a valuable tool of social policy, critics
have argued for a more radical approach. For example, it has been suggested,
based on the experience of OECD countries, that economic development in
the South could be supported through the adoption of more universal, social
insurance and tax-financed group schemes which are not means-tested or
selective (Townsend, 2004, 2007). Revenues to finance such an expansion
would be raised through international taxation, and would help to eliminate
inequalities between industrialized and poor countries. 32
In Brazil more specifically, campaigners have long argued that income and
cash transfers should be provided unconditionally as part of a universal basic
income for all Brazilian citizens (Schwartzman, 2005; Suplicy, 2004). In fact,
as the result of persistent campaigning by Eduardo Suplicy, senator for the
state of Sa˜o Paulo, in 2004 Brazil legalized the concept of a universal basic
income for all its citizens, the only such instance in the world apart from the
US state of Alaska.33 Paradoxically, however, the law retains the principle
of selectivity to favour the neediest and there is no specified deadline for the
implementation of universal coverage. In practice, CCT programmes such
as Bolsa Famı´lia are portrayed as the first step in this direction. However,
it is generally accepted that there is little prospect of the final destination
being reached in the foreseeable future.
Senator Suplicy has suggested that a citizen’s income in accordance with
the new law be provided to all members of the eleven million families
presently eligible for benefits under Bolsa Famı´lia, a form of selective or
stratified universality. However, this would result in a quintupling of the
programme budget. Another proposal is for a universal benefit of R$ 80
(US$ 48) per month for all of Brazil’s sixty million or so children up to
the age of sixteen (Lavinas, 2006). This parallels similar proposals at the
international level.34 It is thought that in Brazil such a scheme could be
funded largely from redirecting the existing social budget, at a total cost of
R$ 18 billion. This would include Bolsa Familia, which cost R$ 8.2 billion
in 2006 (and is expected to rise to R$ 11 billion in 2008).
32. Such as the 1972 Tobin Tax on currency transfers (Townsend, 2007).
33. Law 10,835 was ratified on 8 January 2004, after having spent eleven years going through
Congress.
34. Along similar but more ambitious lines, Townsend (2007, 2008) has suggested the progres-
sive introduction of an international child benefit scheme. Starting with the poorest coun-
tries, it would be funded through employer contributions to social insurance programmes
in OECD nations and a currency transfer tax.
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There are persuasive arguments in favour of moving towards a more
universal, non-means-tested, rights-based system of cash stipends embracing
a much larger proportion of the relatively poor in specific categories, rather
than just the ‘poorest of the poor’, or even to the entire population. Thiswould
help address problems inherent in CCTs, for example, of administrative
complexity, high costs of mean-testing and monitoring compliance, and
unfair distribution of benefits to less needy groups at the expense of the
poorest.
Yet it is open to question whether such a universalistic approach would
find acceptance in Brazil, even if the additional funding could be found. In
the initial days of Bolsa Famı´lia, for example, cash payments were seen as
more of a citizenship right or basic income approach and the monitoring
of beneficiary adherence to conditionalities such as attendance at schools
and health clinics was not strongly emphasized by the government, whether
for reasons of political expediency or ideological persuasion. However,
there was a strong backlash from the public, which ‘repeatedly demanded
that tighter and more transparent procedures be used to screen potential
beneficiaries’ (de Britto, 2008: 188). This reaction was presumably based on
the general fear that the ‘undeserving’ poor might benefit or that the system
might otherwise be abused.
In the meantime, Bolsa Famı´lia is likely to remain high on the social
policy agenda in Brazil. It is estimated, for example, that 60 per cent of the
eligible population remains untouched by the programme, leaving plenty of
scope for expansion (Soares et al., 2007). There is thus little prospect at the
moment that it will lose popularity as a major instrument of social policy.
It serves the purpose of various domestic and international interests and,
like many social protection programmes, is subject to a high level of path
dependence from which reformers might find it difficult to deviate.
As a double-edged sword, however, it could cut both ways. Notwithstand-
ing its obvious attractions, policy makers may well find that, in terms of
attacking poverty and inequality, the longer-term costs of the world’s largest
CCT programme could outweigh its benefits. Forward-looking policy mak-
ers will be aware of these dangers and be considering how to build upon the
progress witnessed to date. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that future
incarnations of Bolsa Famı´lia will have to seriously address the challenge
of integrating the programme into a wider development strategy which seri-
ously attempts to link cash transfers more effectively with employment and
income-generating initiatives.
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